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Game Theory and Linguisric Meaning contrast with Lewis, we shall demonstrate that such a convention is conducive to conflict rather than co-ordination.
Long before game theory and semantics. inde.:d. long before economics i t~elf. exchange conducted hy means or mon.:y was linked to language. In the Republic (37 lc) Socrates talks about "money as a token for the purpose or exchm1ge:· Economists have long argu.:d that, for money ro function as a mechanism of exchange. there must hc some assurance--ca1Tied by institutions and language---{}f its quality. Our argument is simple. S upposing money and language are interrelated the way that philosophers and economists often claim th.:y are interrelated, if we do not take money solely on the basis of trust, why do we lllke claims regarding truth on the basis of trust? TI1erc are two pa1ts of our chapter. First, we review Adam Smith's argumcm that the evolution of monetary institution~ i~ tied up in che p roblem of detecting deceitful 1ne1<1l uffeto::d in exchange. Smith points to no s uch compamhlc institution by which deceitful policy advocacy is detected and severely punished.~ Yel hi~ rc:commcndation for caution in Lhe ernluation of policy advocacy poinL~ Lo the caution chat rourincly prevailed in monetary matters before public safeguards evolved t\i make the metallic content of the medium of exchimge lransparclll ru1d LO preserve its quality. Second. we Lum Lo a diff.:rent sort of deceit. in the reporting of statistical evidence. We apply Smith's insights regarding counterfeit money to the case of incentives for deceit in reporting statistical rcsulL~. In the production of "truth". there is no evolved institution that compares to the Mint. We summarize our rcccm work regarding how another instirutioncompeting expert witnesses might deal w ith deceitful s tatistical argumcms.
We juxtapose these two broad topics. money and truth telling. to emphasize tbe common SlruClure they share_ !hat of an insti tutional rram.:work rhar relies (rightly or wrongly) on trust carried by language. lt is importanL to emphasi1e. in addition. that these arc pan of our larger enterprise. l:iconomists model ordinary people a~ seeking the private good of happiness. Yet we persist in thinking of ourselves, qua economists. as seeking the public good of truth. And we have failed lO confront the inconsistency in such a modeling prOCt!dure (Peart & Levy, 2005) .
ADAM SMITH ON DECEIT
As economists have only recently re-acquainto::d t.hemselves wid1 language as an object of study (Rubinstein. 2000) . a paK~age from S mith ·s Lectures on Jurisprudence that links money and language might not come readily to mind:
The offering of a shilling, whkh to us i1rp.:a·s tn have so plain and a simple a meaning, is in reality offering an argument to persuade one to do so and so fL~ il is for his interest. Men always endeavour 10 p~rsuude others 10 he of their opinion even when che matter is of no consequence Lu them ... ( 1978. 352) ff offering money is a form of persuasion wrapped up in the scmamie notions of meaning and truth , then what is the semantic counterpart of counterfeiting money? incentives conducive to trulh seckintt? This is the subjccl of the issue of Social £pi.11enwlogy f1>r which Foigcnbaum & I .evy (199 3) served as the jum1iine, off point.
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In an age in whjcb torture \lr'ac; rouLi1u.~ ~•ati: policy, the penalfies infljrted upon the auacks on lhc rn<>ncrary bi1sis of the stale were noticeable for their savagery. An allack on the sovereign's monetary authority was viewed in much the same light as ao atmck on the physical body or the sovm:ign (Kelly, 1981) . Tbe juxtaposition of fu>ctions of the l!nil~-d States Secret Service-protecting the l'residtnl and comb>1ting couote. rfeit currency-is a surviving in;lancc of such an idcorificarion. The use of 1111.:tal~ 111 th1> rude si.1te w~ Jllcnded " ll h 1wo very considerahlc 111coll\C01enc1e.<: first wilh 1lw 1roublc uf weighing: and, secondly. w11h that of assaying them. Jn the preciou< metals. where: a s mall difference in the quu111i1y makes a great difference in U1e 'alue. C\'Cn the husinc. " of we1gh1 ng. with proper exxtne». requ ires a1 lc11s1 very accurate "'c1g h1s ruid ,calcs. The w cigh111g of gold 111 panic ular is an 01>cn11ion of some nit:cty. I n Ille coarser mcrnls. indt'ed. where a ' mall error wou ld hi! of liu lc consequence. k s> accuracy wo uld. no doob1. b<: lll'<:C>'al). Yet we should find II "ceSSl\cl) trouble<ome. if every umc: a poor man had occa<ion cmher Ill buy or sell a fanl11ng '< wonh of good-'. he was nhligoo to weigh the
Then 1hcre is pn1blcrn of J~..aying:
The o r cra1i11n of a1>M1ying is st ill more 1.ltffic ul1. still more tedious. and. unless ;1 ran of lite melal i> fairly 1ucltcd in the cnicible. '"lh proper dis<olvcms. an) i:onclusion thai can be drawn from it. i' e~1remely uncen ain llcforc th<' 1n<1im11un of coined mo11c:y. however.
unlc~> they went through !his L cclious a nd 1lif'fict11L operation. r coplc must :il wltys have been liabk to the i;msscsl l"rauds a nti imposition<, and it1'lcad of a fXlt111d weigh! uf pure sil ver. o r pure copp.!r. might receive 1n c'Changc tor their goods. an adullera1cd ~cm1 posi1ion of lhe t:oat'SC\t ,and cheapest lll3tenab. which hnd. however. in I heir outward apf)Canuu;c. been m;idc to n:'cmhlc !hose metals. <I. iv 't7J
For each probh:m. ;1 ~1 of '<)lutioos "offered To preve111 " . 1d1abuse,, 10 facihl atc exchange~. and I hereby to encourage all ,ons of industry ;mt.I co1tuncrcc. tt has ti.:cn found nccc:,sary. 1n all coumnes tha1 hJve maJc Jrl) con'1dcrable Jdv.mce> ""' ,m.Js tmprovemem. 10 affix a puhlic stru11r upon ccnain qu.u11 1 11c~ of such parucul ar mernb. us were in those coun11ic:; commonly rnadc use of 10 purchase ,goods. lience the origin of coined muney. ru11J of thooc r 11hl ic offices c alled 111ims: inMi lutions cx;ictly of the >ame na1urc: " 'ith 1ho-;e of Lhc aulnagcr' anJ stampmastcrs of " oollen amJ linen cloth. All of 1hem an: equal!) meant 10 a;ccriain. by mc:in' of a public stamp. the quan1i1y anJ unifom1 goodness of 1hose diffcrcm cnmmo<lilies when hrought 10 mar~c1 (I. iv , 7)
Smith Lhcn argue, 1hai hiMol) can be i:xplamed a,, folio" ing an t.:'olutionary pathv.ay:
The h~l puhltc k stamp' of lhi• k111J that were affixed 10 the current mc1al,. ~ccm in many ca'e' L O have hccn imenJcd to ascertain . whJl 11 was both mos1 difficult .111d most 1111ponant to a'ccnain. the goodness o r finc nc;< of 1hc metal. and 10 have rcscmbl~ the >terhng mark wh1l'it is at prcM:ni affixed 10 plalc and bars of silver, or the Spanis h mark which is ~01rn:1imes aflhc<l to ingn1s of gold. :u1d whic h hc ing '1 nic k only upon one s iJe of the piece. and not ctwcri ng the " hole surf.ice. ascerlJtn' !lie fine ness, hu1 not the weight of the 1neial. (I. iv ~8)
The 111con"emcncy and diflicul1y of weighing those 111e1<1ls with cxaclnes' g ave occa.<ion to lhc 111Mi tu1ion of coins. of which lite stamp. covering c:m ircly t>cnh side' of the piece and ~urncum~ the edges too. "'as <uppoi.cd to l-..c<'n:ll n not onl) lhc hncne.,. hut tbc weight of the metal. Sueh coins, Lhereforc. 
G11me Thco1y and Linguisric Meaning
The passages we omitted above, and those which follow. suggesl wlhy it took Smid1 iwenry years to complete the Wealth of Natio11s. Ile has surely forgotten more about the history of coinage than these two readers will ever know. When Smith describes the state policy of debasing coinage as a type of fraud, perhaps his readers rt:called the proverbial question-who guards the guardians''
The problem of deceit is critical to what might be considered as Smith ·s public choice view of state policy. Needless to say. a policy of state-sponsored monopolies is the systematic target of the Wealth of Nations. Smith ex.plains this policy is founded upon preventing deceit. T his argument appears in the c.:onclusion of Book I in which the interc.~ts or I.he different classes of society are c.:ontrasted. 'vVe stmt with the workers' employers:
His employers constitute the third order, that of 1hose who liv<: by profit. II is the stock that is employed for the sake of profit. wbich pu1s i1no mmion Lhe greater pa1t of the useful labour of every society. The plans and projecls of lite employers of stotk regulate and di1·cct all the most important operations of labour, and prolil is the end propo~ed by all those plans and projects. flut the rauc of profil doeb not. like rem and wages, rise with the prospcri1y. and fall with the declension of 1he sociely. On the contrary. it is nan1rally low in rich. and high in poor countries, and ii is alway~ highest in the countries which arc going fastes1 to min. The imcrcsl of this thin! order. therefore. has noi the same conncc1ion with 1he general interest of the society as that of the other two. (1. xi "1264)
Smith appeals to a learning by doing explanation for differential compet· ence:
Merchants and master manufacturers are. in this order. the two classes of people who commonly employ the largest capitals. and who by 1hcir wcallh draw 10 themselves the greate~t share of the public consideraiion. As during their whole lives they are engaged in plans and projects, they have frequently more acuteness of understanding than the :greater pan of country gentlemen. As tllcir thoughts. however. are commonly exercised rather about the interest of their own particular branch of business. than about that of the society, t heir judgment. even when given with the greatest candour (which it has not been upon every occasion) is much more to be depended upon with regard to the former of those two objects, than with regard lo the latter. Their superiority over the roumry gentleman is. not so much in their knowledge of the puhlic interest, as in their having a belier knowledge of their own interest than he has of his. (I. xi , 264) This competence has cash value:
ll is by this superior l<nowlcdgc of their own in1erest that they have frequently imposed upon his generosity, and persuade<.! him 10 give up both his own interest and that of the public.
from a very simple but honest conviclion, that their interest. and not his. was the interest of the public. The imerest of the dealers, however, in any particola1· branch of 1rade or manufaclurns, is always in some respects different from, and even opposite to, lhat of the public. To widen the market and to 11a1Tow the compc1i1ion, is always the interest of the dealers. To widen the market may frequently be agreeable enough to the interest of the public; hut to narrow the compclition must always be agriinst it, and can serve only to enable the dealers, by raisitig 1bci.r profi1s above what they natural ly would be, to levy, for !heir own bcoelll, an ab~urd tux. upon the rest of their fellow-citizens. (!. x.i ~264}
All or this molivate$ Smith's udvice to his readers. Lacking an institution that serves as the rhetorical equivalent of rhe public mint. each citizen must weigh and assay arguments made by rhc Pf{'l'O'.tl of an~ n~ la" ,,.. n·gul31tl'lfl ,,, (OrllJll<n-c: "h:icii c~ from th" v'ller. <JUght .t1"3~> 11• he 1stened "'"uh gl'l'al pra:autu'n .u1d OO!!hl ~<'rto h<' Jdop4c:d ttll after havmg ho.-en long .ind carefully <'xammL-.l. not only w11h the most scrupulou.<. l>ut wuh the most \u;picmu' 011co11on lt come< from an ortkr of men. "hose intcrc>t 1< nc'a c:"1c1I) th<' 'aim.; w1lh lhJI of 1hc public." ho hJ1e gc1wr,1ll) an interest 10 doccl\c and''"'" to opprc~ 1hc public. and who m.:wrdingl y huve. upon many occu.,ions. bo1h d1..-ccivcd and opprc,M.:
Inc que;tton 10 '' hich "e llO\\ tum i\ "hc1hcr competi ti on anwng dc<:c1\'cr~ i.< ,ufficicn1 10 sol' I.' <;nutJJ ·, problem of ~ece11 in the arena of 'm1is1icul reporting.
WHAT D OES T HE Eco~O~IIST WA~T?
To model a dccei1ful philosoph<:r. we need tn ..ay what he want'" We rcprc:scnt th" is.sue in term' of our pre' 1ou~ \\Ori.. on cthtl:\ and c,umatton (Lev) & Pe;tn. 2006). In Figure I . \\C prc,cnt competing prderencc-. over c.~timatc' where we model the 1rade·off hc1ween h1a> and 'tatistical t:ffic1cncy. We dcpart from 1hc tcxthool.. treatmcnt of th e goals of .wtistical rcsc:m'Cl1 and :1llow 'bia' in one din .. -ction to he: a desired property of am estimate. A rc-cnrcher may pn.:f.:r to rcprc,ent the \\Orld one wa) rather than anolhcr The constraiat we 11naginc lollows Lhc 'implc mcchm111:!> of 'Jll:nficauon ''-'arch or d•lla m111111i;. where 1me make' many c'umntc.~ and pick.<> a fa,oritc (Leamer 198 '.\. Denton 198:'i). In p;1111cular. these constrainb. the rcph1.:auoo '>CL n:>uh from .:umputing ;1 numhcr of unh1:i,cJ c ... 11m.1te' and mapping out the lmnuer combma11on of bia' and cfficio.:ncy (l·eigenhaum & 1.c' y. 199(1). We 1.:unsider 1wo sons of preference~ one 1111 11 puhlk-spiritcd stati.<>tic ian and one fur ~ome one with both public and private ''<lllh. fhc pubhc-<;pirited stati>tict:in " 1ntere,ted only 111 \Ill· lhtlcal clhdcnc). J number" ithouL a <.1gn E:.ilher the sta11~1idan doc' nm care :ihout the value of the parJmeter to he estimated or. pcrhap<; he d<>e' 1.:arc. but he is unwilhng to g ive up any amount of \tatt\ttcal efficiency to get a more plca.,ing c-.11malt!. In F'igUTe I. th" poss1h1ht) is de'l:nbcd by md1lh:rencc cune JJ. JCor such o ,1attsttc1an the rational estimate 1' J' When po<itf\c b1a.~ 1~ a good. ho" e\ er. indifference cun c' tal..e the <.hape marked by U. Thu> the r.111onal est1m;1tc:. nnc:: in which son ic ~tatistical efficiency is 1radcd away for some gain i11bias.1. -. i ' .
The A mcri1.:an legal system seem\ an id.:al c:hc 10 consider such rational cl11111.:e estimjt1on in 111.:01111x.:1itivc contc~t becau.,e the;: 111011v111wn fur non·tran,.,parencic~ "all-too ohvious. In this ron1c~1. the problem is that contending client.~ hi1e cxpcr1 economc1rida11s 10 press their ca~c before a JUI)'. Strudural equallon esomaaon is a natural tc't ground for chill.in~ nbout h<m the Lh1.:on~ts · moti'a1111n' are aftcctcd because Lhe 1dcnt1f}mg rc.,Lri•tions How from thoorcucal insight. It " perh:ill' not a comcidencc that strul·turnl equJtton estimation is at,11 fenilc ground to ,1uJ} deceitful c'>ltm.tllon because current ~011,cnaon, do llO{ require the rc..c.irchcr to document the con...equcncc-. of d1tlcrent selcctmns ol m'trumental \arlablc,. P.rice = <X1 + a 2 Quantjty + oc.i Cost + oc 1 Weather + oc 5 Politics + e: ( S j We suppose that the statistidan has preferences over the estimated value of 132-A researcher is required by convention to report only D . mentioning S casually. Thus, one can choose whether to include one, two or three exogenous vm'iables from S. The rational choice estimate is the result of computing all possible combinations which identify a system and then picking. As above, we suppose the client and the sympathetic cxpe11 wants both bias and statistical efficiency. We measure the efficiency of estimator i. by the minimum mean sqLiare error IMSE*] of the estimates considered relative to the MSE of estimator i.; thus, MSE* /MSE;.
A simulation is provided to give some idea of the ease with which biased estimates can be generated by such a selection procedure. There arc several techn. ical details. First. what is the distribution of the exogenous variables'! If they are omitted not only do they change the en-or distrihution but also the degree of over-identificati on, which changes dramatically the properly of 2SLS estimates (Phillips. 1983 ). In the ca~e considered. all exogenous variables are assumed to be a standard normal. Thus. omi tting an exogenous variable in search of a pleasing outcome w ill not change the normality of the rc..~ulting errors.
9-rhe alph .. urcall I; fl 1 is 10: !32 is ·I: fl3 is 3.
We consider two types of scan:h. First, there is an unconstrained search for lhe maximum (minimum) value of the estimates 01 132. In the Tables below this i.~ caUed "Max" anti '"Min." SC\:ond. there is a search which is constr.iincd I)) the d~ire co have at lelbt iwo exogenous variables in tbc supply cu rve. These are called ··c-Max'" and "'C-Min.'" This will ~uggc.~t how mui:h die researcher might be willing to give up in efficiency to get bias. 100,000 e)(periments for N=25, 100, 400, 1600 arc !)l!rformctl in Shazam 8.0 (White, 1997) .
All of the simultaneous estimate~ arc replicable "two-st.age lea>! squares'" estimate~ or "'inefficient two-stage least squares" although only 2SLS and OLS are non-deceitful. The divergence between the "rational choice" estim11h: und the transpare nt 2SLS esti mate can be thought of as transparency hias. Such bias pcrsbts through the c.:ase of N= l600. 'u Tab Whi le the bias declines in abwlme value as N increases. the reduction in bins from incre~1s-1ng N by a fnctor of four can be held in Ch«k by moving from the C-Max (C-Min) to Max (Min) . This suggeSts that the problem of convergence will depend upon how the po~1hle models increase as N increases. The simulation con,idered only exogenous variables which were truly indudcd in the structure. We leave the problem of identifying the system by employing random numhers for future research. The problem of "p-,eudo-identificatioo"" rai~es chcorctjcaJ question.
• that emerged at the dawn o f simultaneous equation estimation and seem to have re-appeared in a new guise. 11
The literarnre on the economic~ of expert witnesses has supposed that the jury decision will be made on the busis of an average of such biased esti mates. This average is w hat the jury believes to be rme. The cond usion of Froeh & Kobayashi ( 1996) for the case of biased e)(pcns he fore a jury, is th at the average of their estimmc.s wi ll be unbiascd. ''In this. chcy arc followed by Po&ncr who oontcnds lh>t mis propcny of a oompetith'C procedure males 1hc idea of a co1111-n1111ointed expcn witue.s unwal'rnntcd: "Ille use of n court-appointed expcr1 is problematic when \for example. Ill the d.1mages phase of lhc case) lhc ~)(per1 witness'~ bonom line is a number. For then. in lhc "~'"" of oppming witrte•scs, the trier of foci c:in 'split 1hc difference: after wei)!btin~ c:icli witrtc" 's cstin1au: by its pluu.,ibilicy"( l'osner. 1999, p. 1539).
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Game Tht'Ol.1 and Lini:ul\lll' , \k.inmg from the whlcs all11\c that. roughl) spe;:1l.1n1!. the polic) de1crmmcd h)' the a\cmgc of l\h n .ind Ma' 1>r b) the averat?C of C-~lm and C-. \l:u "111 be unh1a,ed. llt1'4c...,1:r. chis pohc} ''ill ha\c a h1ghcn.m.iru: than .i policy determined b) both using 2!'.L5. v.om.:' ahout the eflic1cnc) of the proces:... thcn 1hc1r opt1mi~mabou1 the unres1m:1cd compcllll\C process ol C).pcrt witnc'' ~rn< more complicarcd than lh.:y suggc't A rule "h1ch coo\tr.1111' cxpcrt' In 1cpon onl} 2SLS rc,ul l' "ould hJ\C a "na.llt.'1' 'anance 1h.1111hc compcllll\1: pn.xc" mo<leloo Jbt" e.
C ON CLUSION
l:scn under the 1dealitcd cond111ons dc,t·n hi:d ahcnc. compcti111111 gcncrarc' rhc ob' 11111' pmhlcm nl a prisoners' dilemma. This rc. ,ull' from a convenrion wl11d1. contrary to thow modeled in Lewis (I 9691. forms the h:isis of t·1 1nflti:1 rather than co-onh11:111on The r.:~ult 'ul:! l:!C'l' th.it 11 'h1•uld he JlO'-"bk 111 pnlJ>O* a parclo 'upcnur comen111111 \\.: llffcr o ne such. One promisi ng approach to deal with the ralional choice of statistical deceit come.s out of biomedical reseiu-ch. in which cl inical trials are qui le literally matters of life and death (Berger cl al., 2006) . The authors suggest that cxpens. who are sympathetic L o paticnL~ bt:ing victimized by the advice llowing from ill-designed clinical statistical procedures, might follow the thought experiment of John Rawls. So, medical experts would imagine tht:mselvcs behind a veil of ignorance in which their private rational choi ce considerations are set aside.
In the context of the re~earch design, the .. veil of ignoranc., .. idea 1>0uld require 1hat researchers agree to constme a~ optimal only those design melhods that all research would willingly assent antcccdentially (i.e., before they had looked at a particular sel of data.) (Berger ct al.. 2006) Our suggestion of stulistical arbitration might he one method that passes the deep test pr<r posed hy Ritwls. II' an expert will not pre-commil to a procedure, his clients might wdl have a good reason lO ask why not.
